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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\L\.\H'l'IN W. KELLER and JOAN 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs . 
. \L\XfNE PATRAKIS, 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs against the defendant 
for dnmag·cs as a result of personal injuries and property 
1 lamagt> sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of an 
nutornobilc accident. 
DINPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of the instant case was held on the 18th and 
l!Jt!i dnys of June, 1969, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake <'onnty Lefore the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, 
11 itl1 a .iur;'. On June 19, 1969, the jury returned a verdict 
i;, L1n1r of defendant and against the plaintiffs for no 
1 
cause af action. Subsequently, the plaintiffs made , 
motion for a new trial, ·which motion was denied 01 
August 18, 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek to have the order of the lower 
court denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial reYersed 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of an automobile accidP11 1 
which occurred on October 28, 1967, at approximat1·h 
1 :00 p.m. near the intersection of 21st East and Sunn: 
side AYenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 105, 107) T!J1, 
accident occurred when the automobile owned and 
driven by plaintiff l\Iaartin vV. Keller and in which hi, 
"'if e, plaintiff Joan Keller, was riding as a 
was southbound on 2100 East and had stopped i11 th" 
center lane of a three lane highway for a red light at 
the intersection with Sunnyside A venue and was struck 
from the rear by an automobile being driven by the de-
fendant Maxine Patrakis which was also southbound 01 1 
2100 East in the center lane of traffic. (R. 107) 
On the day of the accident, it was raining moderatel1 
and the roadways were wet. (R. 106) The defen<lmn 
Patrakis was eighteen years of age at the tii11, 
of the accident and was driYing her father's 1967 Chen11 
let automobile which had been purchased new approx1· 
mately three months prior to the collision. Prior to th1 
accident, Miss Patrakis had driven the car for approxi 
2 
11 ullei> t\10 honrs in the ram and had noticed that the 
111 ,11;1';; 011 t]1C' automobile would squeak and grab. (R. 115) 
'l'li<' approach to the intersection of 2100 East and 
:-; 11 !l11)·sidP ,\ n'nne is unobstructed for several hundred 
11 I'! as is shown i11 photographs of the scene. (Ex. P-1) 
.\J,o dt·fr11clant co11cedes that she could probably see the 
;1111·r,,1·etio11 from further back tha11 one hundred fifty 
frd. (H. 114) 
l'pon approaching the intersection of 2100 East and 
:-;1lll11yside Annue, the defendant testified she observed 
1 l1l' sC'rrwphore light being red approximately one hun-
rln·d fit't)· to two hundred feet prior to the intersection, 
:rnd at this time, she was travelling at approximately 
t11·<·11ty-fiw to thirty miles per hour. (R. 107) At a point 
,r1111cwhat closer to the intersection which she estimates 
ti1 ill' sennty-fin feet, she applied her brakes hard. 
I It. 11:2) 
Tlw tkfcndant claims that the brakes failed to give 
iir·1 any reaction (R. 108) ; however, she concedes that 
,J11• had slowed to approximately five miles per hour at 
1 IH· timl' of the impact. (R. 108) Also, she knew that the 
11atl'r might have some effect on the brakes and that 
tli1·>· had squeaked and grabbed on the day of the accident 
l1(•<·ausp of moisture on them. (R. 115, 116) 
Following the accident, the brakes were apparently 
i11 11,.rf<>et condition, and the car was driven home by the 
il1·!'1·1Hlant who exhibited no concern for their failure. 
'Ii. 118, 119) Also the defendant's father had the brakes 
:i 
on the automobile checked by a mechanic shortly follo 11 
ing thL' accident, and they were found to be functioniu" 
properly. (R. 130, 132) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIV-
ING THE ''BRAKE FAIL URE'' INSTRUC-
TION AND IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEvV TRIAL. 
The plaintiffs' basic contention in support of their 
motion for a new trial was that the court erred in giving 
Instruction No. 9 which was requested by the defendant 
and which is as follows: 
''An automobile driver who has no notice of 
f arulty brakes and could not discover the de feel 
through the exercise of reasonable care is not 
responsible for any damage caused by bral.i 
failure. 
If the driver knows or should know of such 
a defect, however, and takes no precautionary 
measures, he is liable for the consequence.'' (R 
36) (Emphasis added) 
The plaintiffs made a timely exception to this instruc-
tion. (R. 123, 125) 
It is clear that there was no evidence of any "brah 
failure" and to allow Instruction No. 9 relating to hrah 
failure to be given to the jury gives the defendant an add-
ed advantage not warranted by the evidence and is ex-
tremely prejudicial to the plaintiffs. The facts of the ac· 
cident indicate that the defendant simply failed to 
adequately allo-w for the increased stopping distance re 
4 
'\uirPd 011 a wet road and in driving a car which had 
pn•\ iously gi,·en some indication of haying moisture on 
tlw hrnkPs whirh had affected their reaction. The defen-
dnn! conc·Pdes that she was aware that moisture on the 
\ 1r:1kes would aff eet their reaction, and her testimony is 
;h foll<nn;: 
''Question: Now, had you had any difficulty 
prior to that time with the brakes on your vehicle, 
the day I'm talking about 1 
Answer: Well, as I started out in the morn-
ing and as I progressed doing my errands, the 
brakes would squeak and they would somewhat 
grab ·when I applied them. (R. 109) 
• • • • 
Question: Didn't you conclude from that that 
the water might be having some effect on the 
Answer : Yes. 
Question: And on this occasion when you ap-
plied them you said they squeaked again T 
Answer: Pardon me. 
Question: Oh, this accident happened as it 
was happening you said the brakes squealed when 
you put them on but didn't stop you T 
Answer: This is correct." (R. 116) 
Following the accident, the defendant drove the . 
:rntomohile two or three miles to her home, and her 
Lith(·r had the brakes on the automobile tested by a 
r1wehanie who found them to be functioning properly. 
'l'hp plaintiffs do not dispute that the statement of 
t 111' law SL•t forth in Instruction No. 9 is correct and this 
j, forth in the rase of White v. Piney, 99 Utah 484, 
1U8 P.:2<l :249. However, there mw..;t be some evi<lenee 01 
a defective con<li ti on in the brakes in order for such a11 
instruction to be given, and to give the same to a jur1 
whl're 110 evidence supporting a defective condition j, 
iHtrodueed is clearly prejudicial. For cases settillg fortL 
thl• rule that there must be some e\·idcnce to support" 
theory of the ease before an iHstruction concerniug th, 
same is warra11ted, see TVebb v. 811ow, 102 Utah 43::J, I:t 
P.2d 114, and Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 41; 
P.2d 664. 
The Supreme Court of the State of W ashi11gto11, 
when presented with the issue involved in the insta11'. 
ease, ruled that it was improper to give a "brake failun··· 
instructicrn where there was no evidence of a lm1kP 
failure. In the case of Woods v. Goodsen, 55 \Vash.2il 
687, 349 P.2d, the defendant driver stated that she ap-
plied the brake pedal but the brakes failed to respond, 
and she struck a truck which, in turn, struck the plaintifl 
who was a pedestrian. The defendant claimed a hraki 
failure clef ense, and the court gave two "brake failurr" 
i11structio11s which were substantially the same as In-
struction Nos. 9 and 10 given by the co mt in the instant 
case. Expert witnesses were called \vho testified that th" 
brakes were in proper operating condition when the m·- , 
cident occurred, and no evidence of a brake failure wa' 
introduced. The experts further testified that in thei1 
opinion, the alleged ''brake failure'' was due to th 1 
fact that the motor was not running when the defenclalll 
attempted to stop her automobile thus rendering it mor1• 
difficult to stop the automobile which was equipped witl: 
6 
[J1>\11·r !>rahs. In holding that it was prejudicial error to 
1·1· tlw · · hrnkr' failure'' instruetions, the Supreme Court 
"r \Ya.-;!ii11gto11 stated in part as follows: 
'' Tlw respondent was charg0d with knowl-
P<lge that, when the motor was not running the 
hrakes would not function.* * *An automobile can 
])(' a dangerous instrumentality. The dri\·er there-
of is, therefore, charged with knowledge of its 
operational limitations. 
* * * * 
* ' The giving of instructions Nos. 18 and 19 
was not merited by the evidence. The instructions 
were prejudicial because thereby the jury were 
permitted to exculpate the respondent from lia-
bility, if they found she did not know that ·which 
:-;he is charged in law with knowing." (349 P.2d at 
p. 734) 
(lthi>r eases supporting the rule set forth in the TVoods 
('a:-;t.' an' Cdy of Miami v. Fletcher, 167 S.2d 638 (Fla., 
J1IG.f), where the court held that a "brake failure" in-
,lrndion was properly not given where the driver knew 
qf trnnhle with the brakes; Harnmonds u. Mansfield, 296 
S.W. 2d G:52 ('I'enn.); and Savage r. Blancett, 198 N.E. 
(111., 1964). 
The law is clear the one who voluntarily operates a 
motor \·eliiele on the public highways undertakes an adult 
;idi1·it)· and the responsibilities which accompany the 
'<llllt· and is bound to be aware of certain basic facts of 
pl1.1 ,i1·al l'l'ie11ce such as the fact that the stopping dis-
:,1111·1· \\·ill increase on a wet roadway and when the brakes 
"11 1111• a11tomol>ile are wet. The defendant was eighteen 
1 1-;n,, of age at the time of the accident; however, the 
7 
siam1an1 of care is th0 same for any driver 
of agP, sex, 0xperienc0 or mental or physical ability. Se0 
Biddle L Mazzocco, 204 Ore. 547, 248 P.2d 364. Also ser 
.Jackiw11 r. Wilhelm, 102 P.2d 731, 106 Colo. 140, when' 
thP court held that the d<>gr0e of care to be exercised by 
a drin•r increases wh0n operating n motor vehicle on ai1 
iey roadway. 
'1'110 d0fendant does not claim that the brakes on lwr 
automobile were defective, and, in fact, introduced eYi-
dence through her father which indicates that the car 
was checked by a garage shortly following the accidrnt, 
and the brakes wer0 found to he in perfect working order. 
(R. 130) 
'ro allow the ''brake failure'' instruction to be gin,11 
is tantamount to giving an "unavoidable accident" in-
struction which is not warranted by the facts of the 
and under applicable Utah law. In lVoodhouse 1'. Joh11-
so11, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah stated in relation to an "unavoidabll' 
aceident'' instruction that: 
''Such an instruction should be given with 
caution and only where the evidence would justify 
it." (20 Utah 2d at p. 13) 
'l'lw following exc<>rpt from the dissent by Justice Ellett 
in the lVoodlwuse case accurately sets forth the dilemnrn 
in which the plaintiff is placed by the giving of an i11 
st ruction such as the '' hrakP failure'' instrnetion in thL· 
instant case where therP was ahsolut<>ly no eYidenel' ot 
<iny defoct in the braking system: 
8 
'' ' •• Such an instruction givEs the defense 
('OUJlS('l two arrows for his bow. He can discuss 
tho O\'idenc<> 011 all phases of the case regarding 
lack of evidence on the part of the defendant, then 
he can draw another arrow from his legal quiver 
and begin to talk about unavoidable accidents as 
if that were something apart from negligence. "' "' 
* It compels the plaintiff to assume the double 
burden of convincing the jury, first that defen-
dant was negligent and second that there was no 
unavoidable accident. * "' "' 
If the jury finds no negligence on the part of 
the defendant, then there is no need for the in-
struction in the first place.'' 
In the instant case, the issue was clearly whether or 
11ot thr defendant was negligent in operating her auto-
mobile under the facts and circumstances present at the 
time of the collision and to allow a "brake failure" in-
to be given was prejudicial to the plaintiffs. 
The facts and circumstances existing at the time of the 
<HTident were that the road was wet and that the water 
!:ad ea used the brakes of the defendant's automobile to 
"'1nc•ak and grab, and that the wet road coupled with the 
wet brakes of the automobile materially affected its 
-toppi11g distance. 
In order for an "unavoidable accident" instruction 
or a ''brake failure'' instruction to be given, there must 
lie some e\'idenee to support the same such as in the case 
of f>orfer v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66. In that 
1"1sr, the defendant was seized with a severe insulin re-
action which caused him to lose control of his automo-
f,jJ(' arnl strike the plaintiff. The court held that the un-
9 
an>idahle aeciclent instruction was proper where the eri-
d011ee indicated that tlw insulin reaction was sudden alld 
('OU!ll not have been foreseen and guarded against Ii>- th 
dd'ernlai1t. This is c011t rasted to the instant case \\'li(•fr 
defendant had driven a ear for (ffer hn> hours prior to 
1 tH' eollision and had obserncl that the brakes were hL-
eoming wd inasmueh as had squeaked and grahht·d 
.A ease similar to the instant ease except for tl11 
"l1rake failure" instruction is Holmes I'. Nelson, 7 Utal1 
+:33, :12G P.2d 722, \d1ere a nnliet of no cause of a('-
tion was returned in favor of defendant who hacl strn('k 
a pedestrian. On appeal, the Court held that the 
of the' motion for a new trial was proper based upon fact' 
rernarkahly similar to those in the instant case as tli1._1 
l'l'latc to the distance from the point where the impact 
oecmTed to the point where the def enclant was fosl 
aware of the need for a change in his course or speed or 
t rn \'el. In the Holm es ease, the def enclant testifie(l that 
he• o hserved the pe{lestrian a bout two h unllrecl feet from 
the point of impact compared to one hundred fifty to (\111 
hundred fc0t in the instant ease and at that time, re-
mon'd his foot from the gas pedal as did the clefernla11: 
in this case (R. 107, 108). In holding that the motion fr1r 
a ne\\' trial was properly granted, tlw Court stafrd <1-
follows: 
""\Ye are of the opm10n that this accide11t 
never should have happened; it was preventahl1 
A careful review of the e\·iclence leads us to tli1 
conclusion that the defendant either did nut :-1·1· 
this child when he said he dicl, or he \ms 110t g-oiw: 
as slo\\·ly as he claims he waf', or that 110 foik<l t 11 
10 
do l'\·prything reasonably possible to avoid strik-
ing the plaintiff by bringing his car to a stop as 
soon as possible or by turning to the right." (7 
l!tah 2d at p. 438) 
CONCLUSION 
Ill c011elusion, it is respectfully submitted that the 
trial ('Ourt rrrcd in giving the "brake failure" instruc-
t io11 \Yh<'n' there was no rvidence that the brakes failed 
''I' that thry were defective. The giving of such instruc-
1 io11 was clearly prejudicial to the plaintiffs and was 
1i111tamom1t to gi,·ing an "unavoidable accident" instruc-
t i<1ll in a l'asc where the facts did not warrant the same. 
The d0eision of the trial court denying plaintiffs' motion 
for a iie\\· trial should be re,·ersed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
.J. ANTHONY EYRE 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
AppellGJnts 
11 
